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Abstract 
 
Terrorist activity has increased and evolved in Western societies in the twenty-first 
century as terrorist organizations have sought new methods to further their ideologies and 
goals.  Counterterrorism thus requires a similar evolution that undoubtedly reverses the 
historic trend wherein counterterrorism has been merely reactive.  Through interviews 
with experts, qualitative analysis of governmental publications and documents, and 
review of existing literature, this project explores the institutions of intelligence, 
education, and the media and their work within the larger counterterrorism and anti-
radicalization framework of Western states.  The project focuses specifically on domestic 
intelligence operations, intelligence sharing agreements, the United Kingdom’s Prevent 
strategy, and media framing of terrorism and counterterrorism.  The future interplay of 
these three institutions requires proactive action and outlook that attempts to mitigate the 
reach of terrorist organizations, particularly in protecting the public from radicalization.  
It will also entail other institutions like religion and non-governmental organizations to 
address the far-reaching societal implications of terrorism. 
Keywords:  Terrorism, counterterrorism, radicalization, intelligence, education, media 
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 In the late twentieth century, modern terrorism transitioned into its fourth wave, 
characterized by transnational terrorist organizations and referred to as the ‘Religious 
Wave.’1  While organizations of the ‘New Left’ third wave were primarily nationalist 
entities who used theatrical approaches, organizations of the fourth wave sought to 
further political ideologies that were often linked to religious and ethnic identities.  
Instead of terrorism being a strategy and a means to an end, it has become more of a 
movement centered around these organizations and their ideology.  Islam is at the heart 
of this wave as groups like al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) have been the 
principle terrorist organizations that the West is combatting and have historically been the 
most durable during this wave.  Many Western societies thus adapted counterterrorism 
measures and policies that focused on neutralizing chemical, biological, and cyber-
attacks.2  Ultimately, analysts and experts considered suicide airplane hijacking to be 
antiquated as this was seen as a tactic used often by the terrorists of the third wave (i.e., a 
theatrical approach).  They also believed mass, simultaneous attacks in general to be 
beyond the capacity and capability of terrorist organizations.  According to Brian Jenkins, 
the goal of terrorism in 1975 was to have “a lot of people watching and a lot of people 
listening and not a lot of people dead.”3  Jenkins highlights the idea that before 9/11 
many experts believed the mechanisms of terrorism to be unitary:  publicity was the key. 
 However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 demolished that viewpoint 
and demonstrated how misplaced these assumptions were.  9/11 was a pivotal point in the 
                                                 
1 David C. Rapoport, "The four waves of modern terror: International dimensions and 
consequences," An International History of Terrorism: Western and Non-Western Experiences (2013), 295. 
2 Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism since 9/11," Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 25, no. 5 (2002), 306. 
3 Hoffman, “Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism,” 306.  
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fourth wave of terrorism that rejuvenated a failing cause.4  It clearly defined this new 
wave of terrorism as the most destructive and indiscriminate wave to date.  Terrorism 
transitioned to a ternary mechanism at this junction, focusing not only on publicity but 
also on the loss of human life and psychological repercussions.  From a publicity 
standpoint, terrorism evolved into a Hollywood-esque phenomenon with terrorist groups 
creating productions and propaganda aimed at recruitment and international messaging.  
In terms of the loss of life, modern terrorism focused on the annihilation of contrary 
ideologies and henceforth used murder as the primary tactic.  Yet, psychologically, this 
new form of terrorism highlighted the elicitation of irrational and emotional responses, 
fear, and intimidation which made it arguably the most important goal of post-9/11 
terrorism.5  It is from this devastating event that we see the emergence of contemporary 
and modern counterterrorism policy and measures.  Analysts and policy-makers had to 
rework and redefine their understanding of and conventional wisdom on terrorism.  Yet, 
this has been the general trend when examining the evolution of terrorism and 
counterterrorism.  Terrorism changes its strategies; counterterrorism has to reevaluate and 
congruously change its strategies.  Counterterrorism must mirror the characteristics of 
terrorism by being tireless, innovative, and dynamic.  It is necessary to create 
counterterrorism policies that no longer allow terrorist organizations and networks to be 
one step ahead, and unfortunately, that has not been achieved yet.   
 Traditional counterterrorism focuses on five components to defeat terrorism:  
diplomacy, economic sanctions, military options, covert intelligence operations, and law 
                                                 
4 Rapoport, “Four waves of modern terror,” 297. 
5 Hoffman, “Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism,” 313. 
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enforcement actions.6  It involves police work, intelligence, special operations, and 
security measures that were successful in combatting the previous waves of modern 
terrorism.  While these strategies are still viable and important components in today’s 
broader counterterrorism strategy, they are not sufficient in fighting today’s terrorist 
organizations that have global roots and connections.  Most of the terrorist organizations 
today are complex entities defined by statelessness, transnationalization, de-
territorialization, and nontraceability.7  Their form of terrorism is planned, purposeful, 
and premeditated.  Diplomacy and economic sanction is nearly impossible due to their 
stateless nature.  Military options are problematic since the groups are unbounded, 
transnational, and difficult to pinpoint.  Intelligence operations and law enforcement 
actions have floundered because of radicalization and lone wolf terrorism, the newest 
dimensions of terrorism.  Both of these dimensions are hard to counter because they are 
so internal, psychological, and isolated.  Radicalization is best defined as when an 
‘unremarkable’ person becomes a terrorist by means of jihadist ideology that “motivates 
young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out ‘autonomous jihad’ via 
acts of terrorism against their host countries.”8  It requires self-identification and 
indoctrination phases that are not always visible to others.  Lone wolf terrorism is a 
consequence of radicalization and accounts for 70% of the deaths and 46% of the injuries 
from terrorism since 2006.9  According to the Global Terrorism Index, lone wolf 
                                                 
6 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism 2002-2005, Washington, 
D.C. (2006), 34; David J. Kilcullen, "Countering global insurgency," Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 
(2005), 606. 
7 Mohammed-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, "ISIS and the Deceptive Rebooting of al 
Qaeda," GCSP Policy Paper 5 (2014), 4-5. 
8 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat (New 
York: Police Department, 2007), 5-6. 
9 Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism (New 
York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), 54. 
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terrorism must be an attack occurring in a Western society, no group can have claimed 
responsibility for the attack or have been involved in the act, there has to be three or 
fewer perpetrators, and there has to be no evidence of external support from a group.   
 How do modern counterterrorism strategies thus evolve to combat the terrorist 
methods of this radical, shifting Islamist ideology?  According to Mohammad-Mahmoud 
Ould Mohamedou of the Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding at the 
Graduate Institute of International and Developmental Studies in Geneva, 
counterterrorism is best viewed in the plural, requiring a multidimensional analysis of 
and approach to counterterrorism.10  Governmental actions combined with media framing 
have promise in helping to understand the gap between evolving terrorism and 
counterterrorism and anti-radicalization tactics.  Intelligence and especially intelligence-
sharing are at the core of counterterrorism; they have been a foundation of traditional 
counterterrorism strategy and will continue to serve as the primary functionary in 
disrupting and thwarting planned terrorist attacks.  Educational institutions though can 
enforce and dignify counter-radicalization rhetoric in their quotidian interactions with 
target audiences as long as they imbue an environment with respect for inalienable 
human rights.  Furthermore, the media has a duty to provide a window into the world of 
terrorism and counterterrorism through which human rights defenders can act and speak.  
While history casts a dismal record on the media after events like 9/11, media framing 
directly impacts the inclusivity of the community to which it reports, and stigmatization 
and prejudicial reactions cannot be a part of that framing. 
                                                 
10 Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, interview by Lincoln Gimnich, July 4, 2016. 
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Specifically, how have the intelligence communities, educational institutions, and 
the media operated in counterterrorism and anti-radicalization strategies thus far, and to 
what extent will they interact in future endeavors?  Through interviews of experts, 
qualitative analysis of governmental documents and publications, and review of existing 
relevant literature, I examine specific examples and implications of the current strategies 
enacted by security institutions and governments and of the actions of the media to define 
the present state of counterterrorism operations.  I emphasize intelligence institutions and 
transnational and multilateral intelligence operations between nation states with weight 
on deeper bilateral agreements, radicalization prevention measures in educational 
systems, and advantageous media framing of both terroristic activity and 
counterterrorism strategies to mitigate radicalization risks.  The future of 
counterterrorism strategies must overcome the general trend whereby terrorism evolves 
more quickly than counterterrorism; it is irresponsible to wait idly for terrorism to evolve 
and then seek potential strategies.  Counterterrorism must be proactive rather than 
reactive.  Ultimately, by understanding the interplay and interaction of these current 
methods of counterterrorism in intelligence communities, educational institutions, and 
news outlets, definitive strategies are deduced that fuse each of these groups into a 
multidimensional approach that can impact the future of counterterrorism in Western 
nations, leading to a less terror-ridden global order. 
Intelligence Operations 
Intelligence is the cornerstone and first-line of defense in countering international 
and transnational terrorism.  As James Igoe Walsh defines it, intelligence is the 
“collection, protection, and analysis of both publicly available and secret information, 
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with the goal of reducing decision makers’ uncertainty about a foreign policy problem.”11  
It gives decision makers new perspectives on terrorism and on the effects of 
counterterrorism policy they select.  Domestic intelligence institutions have increased, 
and domestic intelligence operations have become a vital part of counterterrorism efforts 
with the new trends of radicalization and lone wolf terrorism in Western societies.12  
Internationally, it is often local regimes and governments who are able to analyze with 
the most efficacy the information gathered on terrorist organizations because of common 
culture, language, geography, and past experiences.  This understanding and subsequent 
endemic intelligence necessitates that states share the intelligence they have gathered 
through international agreements to curb the goals of the modern wave of terrorism.  Yet, 
there is also value in intelligence sharing agreements with states who are not part of this 
endemic group yet have large capacity and resources such as agreements between the 
United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).   
 Since 9/11, Western countries have created numerous domestic intelligence 
institutions to help combat terrorist organizations and terror attacks on their soil.  
Whether from organized international groups and networks or from radicalized lone wolf 
attacks, the responses of the Western world have been relatively standard, as they 
primarily have looked for recommendations on how to handle the attack and how to 
guard against future attacks.  Specifically, after 9/11, the US launched itself into the 
metaphoric War on Terror—a war completely disparate from past wars where specific 
enemies were targeted over a recognized state.13  The nature of this “war” proved the 
                                                 
11 James Igoe Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 6. 
12 Global Terrorism Index 2015, 55. 
13 Hoffman, “Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism,” 314. 
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necessity of vital amounts of intelligence and paved the way for Western nation-states to 
create institutions like the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the European Counter Terrorism Centre 
(ECTC). 
 Two of the agencies in the US to come out of terrorist attacks were the ODNI and 
the NCTC.  The ODNI was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 which President Bush signed into law after The 9/11 Commission Report was 
published.14 It and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serve as the head of the US 
intelligence community.  The ODNI acts as the foremost intelligence advisor to the 
President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for matters 
concerning national security.  The NCTC is the primary entity for analyzing intelligence 
related to transnational terrorism and has been the most effective in terms of 
counterterrorism measures and policy.  It is the center for joint operational planning and 
joint intelligence-sharing with pre-existing US agencies such as the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and law enforcement.15  It is the lead 
functionary in operational counterterrorism planning as it investigates potential threats, 
imparts the information gathered, and integrates all tools of national power.  The NCTC 
integrates and analyzes intelligence relating to terrorism that the government possesses or 
acquires.   Serving as the principle advisor to the DNI, it advises on how well US 
intelligence activities, programs, and budget proposals on counterterrorism conform to 
                                                 
14 US FBI, Terrorism 2002-2005, 50. 
15 The 9/11 commission report: Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon 
the United States (Government Printing Office, 2011), 403; “The National Counterterrorism Center,” 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed March 6, 2018, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-home. 
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presidential and national priorities.  Both of these institutions strive to develop an 
institutional culture imbued with deep expertise in intelligence and national security as 
they are designed to be the principal mechanisms in combatting terrorism on US soil. 
 Following the 2004 Madrid Train Bombings and the 2005 London Bombings, the 
European Union (EU) sought to increase the national information- and security-sharing 
of its member states to help prevent attacks of this magnitude from occurring again.16  
However, after the November 2015 Paris Attacks and the 2016 Brussels Bombings, the 
EU pushed to refocus the attention of its counterterrorism measures to more operational 
support by Europol and Eurojust in joint activities and less on just intelligence-based 
information exchange.  The operational outlook prompted the creation of the ECTC.  The 
ECTC is an organization of Europol that acts as the central information and intelligence 
hub for Europe.17  It improves intelligence-sharing, offers members of the EU 
operational, technical, and strategic support, and distinguishes the tools that EU member 
states have at their disposal in their fight against terrorism.  The adoption and 
implementation of the ECTC by the EU raises trust and awareness among the involved 
intelligence authorities (and thus member-states) and allows them to improve their 
counterterrorism operations.  
 In addition to these three intelligence institutions and conglomerates, law 
enforcement in London and New York have developed intelligence-gathering techniques 
that make use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) in surveillance systems.  Evolving 
                                                 
16 Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, Julien Jeandesboz, 
Valsamis Mitsilegas, Francesco Ragazzi, and Amandine Scherrer, “The EU and its Counter-Terrorism 
Policies after the Paris Attacks,” Liberty and Security in Europe, no. 84, (2015), 3. 
17 Europol, “Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre Strengthens the EU's Response to 
Terror,” Press Release (2016). 
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drastically in ten years, London’s use of CCTV coverage consisted of over 100,000 
businesses with 421,931 surveillance cameras and involved at least 500,000 cameras 
when public instructions were considered in 2002.18  For example, a £500,000 CCTV 
system covers Oxford Street, London’s busiest shopping area, and is monitored from the 
Marylebone police station; the Parliamentary Estate also has a CCTV system with over 
260 cameras.  The implementation of CCTV cameras was originally intended to reduce 
and prevent crime in public spaces in London.  Law enforcement sought to increase 
supervision of areas (i.e., Underground train stations) that were prone to crimes like 
assault and theft.19  CCTV camera systems were linked to a network of passenger alarms 
and were continuously monitored from a manned and conspicuously located kiosk.  
However, today’s CCTV operations revolve around the ‘Ring of Steel’ which began its 
installation in 1993 after the Bishopsgate bomb by the Irish Republican Army.20  The 
‘Ring of Steel’ is the city’s defense against carborne terrorism and has effectively shut 
down two-thirds of all the streets that used to lead into the city center.  At each of the 19 
remaining ways to enter the city of London, two CCTV cameras record each driver’s face 
and car’s number plate.   
 In addition to the CCTV system that London has expanded in recent years, New 
York implemented a similar system in 2007 called the Lower Manhattan Security 
                                                 
18 Michael McCahill and Clive Norris, “CCTV in London,” Report deliverable of UrbanEye 
project (2002), 20; it is estimated today that there are nearly 1 million CCTV cameras in the city of 
London. 
19 Barry Webb and Gloria Laycock. "Reducing crime on the London underground." Crime 
prevention unit paper 30 (1992), 4. 
20 Kieran Long, “So can the secret Ring of Steel save the City from terrorism?,” Evening Standard 
(London, England), Oct. 15, 2010. Accessed March 27, 2018. https://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/so-can-
the-secret-ring-of-steel-save-the-city-from-terrorism-6524967.html. 
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Initiative (LMSI) and then the Midtown Manhattan Security Initiative (MMSI) in 2010.21  
New York is estimated to have a number of cameras that is in the thousands yet is still 
significantly dwarfed by those in London.22  The two initiatives cost the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) $160 million.23  The LMSI and MMSI combine publicly- and 
privately-run video cameras with mobile and static radiation detectors and license plate 
readers and make up the Domain Awareness System.24  However, the Domain Awareness 
System is unique from what London uses as it forms a completely networked system so 
that all CCTV camera feeds can be monitored from a single location in real time.  While 
London’s system is static, providing only playback capabilities and not real-time 
monitoring, the New York system is expected to be more effective at stopping crime and 
terror attacks as it allows for real time video analytics.  The system is supposed to 
identify suspicious behavior before catastrophic events like terror attacks can occur.  New 
York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly told reporters, “If we’re looking for a 
person in a red jacket, we can call up all the red jackets filmed in the last 30 days.”25 
 While both of these systems seem to adapt to the technologically-evolving world 
of terrorism and the world in general, the effectiveness of the systems and the security-
privacy trade off they cause have resulted in upheaval and concern.  Proponents claim 
that the systems will allow proactive monitoring of suspicious behavior and quicker 
                                                 
21 Greer, Olivia J. "No cause of action: Video surveillance in New York City." Michigan 
Telecommunication & Technology Law Review 18 (2011): 591. 
22 It is estimated that there is one camera for every fourteen residents in London. 
23 Ali Winston, “Secrecy shrouds NYPD’s anti-terror camera system,” City Limits, April 26, 2010, 
accessed March 27, 2018, https://citylimits.org/2010/04/26/secrecy-shrouds-nypds-anti-terror-camera-
system/. 
24 Fergal Davis, Nicola McGarrity, and George Williams, eds., Surveillance, counter-terrorism 
and comparative constitutionalism, Routledge (2014), 119. 
25 Greer, “No cause of action,” 589-90. 
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apprehension of perpetrators after attacks.26  Such was the case after 9/11 when camera 
footage was used to identify the hijackers.  However, some terrorists do not wish to elude 
identification and do not plan on surviving the attack, rendering this point moot.  Major 
contradiction also points to the inadequacy and inability of the massive London system to 
prevent the 2005 London suicide bombers.  After their detonation of bombs in the 
London Underground subway system and on a bus, CCTV footage of the perpetrators 
entering the Luton Station surfaced.27  What is even more disconcerting though is that 
footage of their conducting a “dry run” at the Baker Street Station nine days prior also 
surfaced.  Definitive examples such as this challenge the efficacy of a surveillance system 
that was supposed to notice and thwart such attacks.  Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, 
the system in New York allows for local law enforcement to recall videos of people in 
red jackets.28  What if, though, on the day that local law enforcement were looking for a 
red jacket, there were numerous people wearing red jackets that had nothing to do with 
the attack?  The results would inundate local law enforcement with arbitrary leads since 
terrorists often wear rather standard and nondescript garb.  Additionally, if someone 
happened to be wearing that red jacket and also had brown skin or was praying at a 
mosque, would these chance attributes stigmatize innocent people and warrant 
questioning on the grounds of stereotypes and biases?  The repercussions of this system 
could lead to a whole new crisis that pushes more people towards radicalization rather 
than towards feelings of safety and inclusion in the community. 
                                                 
26 Kieran Long, “So can the secret Ring of Steel save the City from terrorism?.” 
27 Pete Fussey, "Observing potentiality in the global city: Surveillance and counterterrorism in 
London," International Criminal Justice Review 17, no. 3 (2007), 179 
28 The red jacket is a completely arbitrary article of clothing used simply to express a point. 
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 In 2009, the NYPD released and adopted the Public Security Privacy Guidelines 
that established proper and protective use of the Domain Awareness System and its 
stored data.29  Operators of the system are compelled “to refrain from biased targeting, to 
monitor only areas in which no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, to refrain from 
the use of facial recognition technology, and to require identifying signs on NYPD- and 
stakeholder-owned cameras.”30  The Guidelines stipulate that the data is to be only used 
for law enforcement purposes, limiting third-party sharing of the data.  While the 
Guidelines superficially do their job, it gives a wide amount of flexibility to the NYPD in 
their usage of the Domain Awareness System, and the Guidelines are not legally 
enforceable.  Some people question if this lack of protection for privacy as well as against 
law enforcement’s overstepping of its boundaries is legal.  However, as Chris Dunn, 
Associate Legal Director of the New York Civil Liberties Union, states, “I know of no 
plans by any organization to litigate the presence of surveillance cameras in New York, 
and you can read into that the absence of a good legal argument against them.”31 
 Pete Fussey, a criminologist at the University of Essex, adequately sums up 
surveillance technologies in counterterrorism measures: 
…technological provisions such as CCTV are of limited value unless situated within effective 
intelligence settings or infrastructures that allow adequate analysis, interpretation, and response to 
the captured images, particularly once emphasis is shifted from pre-event deterrence to postevent 
detection.  Thus, despite the growing prominence of determinist discourses that cite technological 
efficacy to avert terrorism, on their own, technological provisions are insufficient.  Hence, the 
social environment into which strategies are deployed is a crucial variable mediating their 
success.32 
 
                                                 
29 Greer, “No cause of action,” 596; the Public Security Privacy Guidelines will hereto forth be 
referred to as the “Guidelines” in congruence with official documentation. 
30 Greer, 597. 
31 Greer, 606. 
32 Fussey, “Surveillance and Counterterrorism in London,” 182-83. 
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Fussey ultimately argues that while surveillance technologies seem to be an important 
component and potentially the prime component of future counterterrorism measures, the 
increase in information they gather must also include proportionate increases in the 
capabilities of human agents to analyze meaningfully the information.33  Furthermore, 
surveillance technologies need to balance security and privacy.  Olivia Greer, an 
associate at Weil, Gotshal, and Manges, advocates for legally enforceable regulations in 
video surveillance programs to protect privacy rights while also allowing them to do their 
intended job.34  Thus, intelligence institutions will best use surveillance technologies for 
filtration and aggregation as assistance to the work of human agents in counterterrorism.  
Moreover, they must also consider privacy concerns by providing adequate legal 
measures to address grievances that may arise. 
In addition to domestic operations, international intelligence sharing agreements 
are a vital part of the Western counterterrorism strategy yet have been an arduous 
struggle to formalize and implement.  The subjective nature of reputation within 
international law often dictates the structure, process, and compliance of these 
agreements between countries.  As a mechanism of international law, reputation 
encourages states to comply to their agreements and allows states to make more credible 
promises and extract greater rewards (i.e., greater intelligence).35  When factoring 
reputation into agreement negotiations and construction, states compartmentalize 
reputational value; they will revise estimates of reliability and future compliance in 
connection with previous agreements that have the same/similar sources of costs and are 
                                                 
33 Fussey, 188. 
34 Greer, “No cause of action,” 619. 
35 Andrew T. Guzman, "Reputation and International Law," Georgia Journal of International & 
Comparative Law 34 (2005), 381, 383. 
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valued the same or less.  This idea of compartmentalization, by nature, generates stronger 
effects in some areas and weaker effects in other areas.  Security circles take longer for 
reputation to develop and sustain because opportunities to comply are far fewer than in 
trade or human rights which are practically quotidian.36   
 Reputation drives the fundamental nature of intelligence agreements, one that 
values trust, compliance, and secrecy.  Intelligence networks are inherently characterized 
by secrecy, flexibility, and informality, which unfortunately translates over to intelligence 
sharing agreements between states and agencies as well; Elizabeth Sepper, associate 
professor at the School of Law at Washington University in St. Louis, accurately states 
that “intelligence sharing networks are constrained almost exclusively by a shared 
professional ethos, rather than law.”37  It is confidence, trust, and perceived benefits that 
drive the “soft law approach” of today’s international intelligence sharing agreements as 
states rely on enhanced relationships in the fight against terrorism.38  However, these 
values are not mutually exclusive to the drafting of these agreements as some have been 
absent when agreements were finalized.  In the 1950s, the US shared intelligence with 
West Germany despite discomfiting apprehensions about the Nazi pasts of many leaders 
in its intelligence services, proving that trust, specifically, is not necessarily essential to 
intelligence-sharing.39 
                                                 
36 George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, "Reputation, Compliance, and International 
Law," The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. S1 (2002), S112. 
37 Elizabeth Sepper, "Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing," Texas International 
Law Journal 46 (2010), 151. 
38 Stéphane Lefebvre, "The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence 
Cooperation," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 4 (2003), 528. 
39 Walsh, International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, 29. 
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Following 9/11, intelligence-sharing required international cooperation to combat 
terrorism since the threat and enemy was and still is transnational.40  Cooperation came 
from a number of superregional groups and international organizations.  After invoking 
Article V of the Washington Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
adopted additional measures to combat terrorism and emphasized its function as a key 
deterrent to and monitor of defection for its members.  Even though there were policy 
differences over the 2003 war in Iraq which could have pushed member states to 
defection, the Alliance “reaffirmed its commitment to intelligence-sharing…, where 
members planned to review intelligence structures.”41  Furthermore, the United Nations’ 
(UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006 speaks further to the role of 
international cooperation in intelligence sharing and countering terrorism.42  The Strategy 
has four pillars:  1) addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; 2) 
preventing and combatting terrorism; 3) building states’ capacities to achieve pillar two 
and strengthening the role of the UN in this regard; and 4) ensuring respect for human 
rights and the rule of law as the basis in the fight against terrorism.  The Strategy was the 
first international resolution that prompted member states to cooperate as best as possible 
in a coordinated effort to combat terrorism; it put numerous countries on the same side 
and provided a commonality by which to share intelligence.  However, this liberal 
institutionalist approach to intelligence sharing agreements (especially multilateral 
intelligence sharing agreements) fails to consider the third-party rule inherent in most of 
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these agreements.43  The third-party rule stipulates that the involvement of a third-party 
(e.g., NATO, the UN) restricts the capacity of the intelligence-sharing because most 
states desire to keep their intelligence secret and privy to only those whom they select. 
However, intelligence sharing agreements recently have found moderate success 
when constructed in the essence of transaction cost economics.  Transaction cost 
economics selectively joins law, economics, and organization theory, maintaining that 
economization of costs and benefits allows “key attributes of transactions and governance 
structures be named and the logic of efficient alignment be worked out.”44  In his book 
The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, Walsh concludes that hierarchy and 
relational contracting, a subfield of transaction cost economics, are the future of most 
intelligence-sharing, especially in regard to counterterrorism efforts.45  According to 
Walsh, “relational contracts lead to cooperation only when they are self-enforcing, that is, 
when they are designed so that no party has an incentive to renege.”46  States develop a 
hierarchy whereby a dominant state exercises authority in the matter over a subordinate 
state in place of a formal third-party institution who would delegate.  Relational 
contracting allows states to govern their relations in a mutually beneficial manner, 
bolstering cooperation and creating more options.   Walsh believes that relational 
contracting presupposes four expectations in terms of intelligence sharing agreements: 1) 
potentially large gains are a necessary condition for intelligence sharing; 2) states will 
share intelligence through anarchic institutions; 3) if the incentives for a state to defect 
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are high but the benefits of sharing are worthwhile, states will construct a hierarchical 
relationship to govern intelligence-sharing; and 4) power imbalances are a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for creating hierarchy.47   
 Ultimately, the construction of the intelligence sharing agreement is a major 
factor in how and what type of intelligence is being shared between countries, 
intelligence that can impact how a country addresses terrorism within its borders.  One of 
the prime examples of intelligence sharing agreements is the UKUSA Agreement.  In 
1946, the UKUSA Agreement was signed between the US National Security Agency and 
the British Government Communication Headquarters (i.e., the “first” parties).48  
“Second” and “third” parties included Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, 
Denmark, West Germany, and Turkey.  This agreement is one of the few declassified, 
formal intelligence sharing agreements; it has been the basis of US-UK intelligence-
sharing since its ratification.  Experts have deemed it “the most important and resilient 
part of British intelligence’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States.”49  Trust is a 
major component of the agreement, and when this trust is damaged or lost, repercussions 
are evident.  Following the Manchester Bombing terrorist incident in May of 2017, a 
series of high profile leaks to the US media of details surrounding the incident caused the 
UK to temporarily stop sharing intelligence with the US.50  After promises by President 
Donald Trump to investigate the leaks to the US’s greatest ability, UK Prime Minister 
Theresa May reinstated intelligence-sharing and called the US-UK relationship their 
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“deepest defense and security partnership.” 51 This vignette highlights how important 
secrecy and trust is in intelligence sharing agreements.  Intelligence has to be kept with 
the utmost secrecy, and when that secrecy is broken in some capacity, countries will 
withhold their information, even in some of the strongest pacts.  When combatting 
terrorism, a country cannot loss information flows because it can severely damage the 
work of analysts in holistically interpreting data that might indicate an attack. 
 However, not every country has the deep level of trust and common goals that the 
US and the UK have, or they may not have similar resources to justify the same type of 
agreement for intelligence-sharing.  Often, this situation is with countries who can 
provide the best intelligence on terrorist organizations because of common language, 
culture, and geography.  Agreements with these sorts of countries often follow the 
relational contracting construction; states such as Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Uganda, and 
Tanzania all have this sort of intelligence-sharing agreement with the US.52  In these 
agreements, the US uses financing, oversight, and/or training to control and monitor these 
states’ intelligence operations.  Intelligence agreements are not necessarily quid pro quo 
though.  Especially in regard to hierarchical sharing, the dominant state (e.g., the US) 
often gives foreign and military aid to the subordinate state in return for intelligence 
cooperation.53  Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt are some of the largest recipients of US 
military training because of this asymmetrical exchange in intelligence-sharing.54  
Furthermore, the US has subsidized the Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence agencies so 
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that American officials are closely involved in the treatment and interrogation of 
individuals transported to these countries (i.e., extraordinary rendition).55  While it may 
seem that the power dynamics between the dominant and subordinate state are 
unbalanced, the subordinate state has power.  The subordinate state is often the state 
directly interacting with sources of human intelligence because of the endemic 
knowledge they have, whether that be of culture, language, or past experiences.  They 
have the capacity to withhold information, limit American access to/participation in an 
interrogation, or stop an interrogation prematurely. 
While not billed as an intelligence-sharing agreement or program, the Anti-
Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), among other things, trains foreign law 
enforcement personnel to respond to and resolve terrorist incidents and investigate and 
prosecute those responsible for terrorist acts in countries like Uganda and Tanzania56.  
The ATA is a US training mechanism to combat terrorism and encourage intelligence-
sharing among other countries participating in the ATA.  It follows the relational 
contracting model for intelligence sharing agreements because of the intelligence that the 
US receives and the funding and technical support it provides for the involved countries.  
This example especially highlights the efficacy of relational contracting structures 
because even in the wider security framework, Uganda and Tanzania were more likely to 
comply with and cooperate on intelligence matters than any other dimension within the 
counterterrorism regime (e.g., passing anti-terrorism and money laundering legislation, 
altering aviation security regulations).57  
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However, a key component in relational contracting is that the benefits of the 
agreement must outweigh and offset the incentives to defect.58  While the US would like 
to have some semblance of an intelligence sharing agreement with countries like 
Pakistan, Syria, or Iran because of their endemic knowledge, this sort of success is 
probably untenable.  The US has repeatedly attempted to create hierarchical sharing with 
Pakistan because of the high value of intelligence it has; however, disparate domestic 
political concerns and professional culture within Pakistan and its intelligence service 
(Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI) have raised too high a potential for defection such that 
the benefits do not offset the costs.59  Furthermore, in the past, the US has lightly 
considered establishing hierarchical intelligence-sharing relationships with Syria and 
Iran.  However, the costs have been deemed too high as profound policy differences are 
the major barrier to intelligence sharing and trusting the content of what would be shared.  
While historically, intelligence has been shared between the US and these two countries, 
it was in times of a common, immediate threat (a case-by-case basis), and the agreements 
were never institutionalized in formal intelligence sharing agreements.60   
Intelligence operations form the bulk of counterterrorism strategy.  Domestic 
operations encompass institutional sharing and surveillance technologies that have 
unsteady success.  The technologically oriented future requires intelligence operations to 
adapt appropriately, yet intelligence institutions have not found the best and most utile 
approach to surveillance technologies that works and addresses privacy concerns.  
Intelligence institutions have utilized intelligence sharing agreements as a means to 
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expand the intelligence to which analysts and policymakers have access.  Trust and 
relational contracting pragmatically explain the structure of current US intelligence 
sharing agreements, and these two frameworks will be crucial considerations for future 
agreements that are made with other Western states and with countries that have endemic 
knowledge about terrorist organizations and operations. 
Educational Institutions 
 Fueled by the numerous terrorist attacks in the Western world, the UK parliament 
resorted to an amalgam of methods that embraced various aspects like military operations 
and intelligence gathering and sharing of traditional counterterrorism strategy.  However, 
the UK began to realize that traditional counterterrorism strategy is not and will not be 
effective against the developing IS, a nontraditional opponent that is transnationally 
bounded.  To approach this issue, the British Parliament developed and implemented a 
national counterterrorism strategy called CONTEST in 2003.61  It since has gone through 
numerous revisions, culminating in the most recent version that was enacted in 2011.  A 
major focus of this strategy was counter-radicalization and deradicalization.  Two of the 
core pillars of CONTEST—Prevent and Channel—accentuate the counter-radicalization 
and deradicalization rhetoric that the UK is using to fight against terrorism.  However, the 
efficacy of these programs has been called into question as they have spurred intense 
backlash from students, human rights groups, and educators across the UK, claiming 
unethical practice and demanding individual protection from discrimination in the 
classroom. 
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CONTEST aims to “reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from 
terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.”62  
CONTEST seeks to achieve this aim through four workstreams, referred to by officials as 
the ‘four P’s.’  They include Pursue, Protect, Prepare, and Prevent.  Pursue works to 
stop terrorist attacks in the UK and against her interests overseas through three means:  1) 
detection and investigation of threats as early as possible; 2) disruption of terrorist 
activity before it can endanger the public; and 3) prosecution of the responsible 
perpetrators wherever possible.63  Protect seeks to strengthen the protection against a 
domestic and/or overseas terrorist attack and to reduce vulnerability.64  It strives to devote 
more resources to border security, identification technology, and coordination of law 
enforcement agencies and responses.  The third workstream, Prepare, is designed to 
mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack when the attack cannot be deterred or stopped.65  
Its goal is to build coordinated generic resiliency to recover from terrorist attacks.  These 
three pillars focus on external threats of terrorism and how the nation-state itself can 
survive and mitigate the effects of terrorism. 
The fourth workstream of CONTEST—Prevent—is where the UK’s educational 
counterterrorism strategy roots itself.  Prevent focuses on the radicalization of British 
citizens and the supposedly “direct” transition from extremism to terrorism.  Prevent is 
viewed as the paramount framework of CONTEST as it espouses often the root cause of 
lone-wolf and radicalized terrorism.  Prevent has three primary objectives.  It responds to 
the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat of those who promote it, prevents 
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people from being drawn into terrorism with appropriate advice and support, and works 
with a wide range of sectors where there are risks of radicalization.66  The third objective 
requires cooperation between the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in 
the Home Office and sectors like faith, charities, the internet, and most notably education.  
Prevent hopes to have “no ‘ungoverned spaces’ in which extremism is allowed to flourish 
without firm challenge and legal intervention.”67  It wants to discourage people from 
viewing terrorism as a legitimate means to an end, and in the vein of Prevent, 
radicalization occurs where terrorist ideologies can bloom without contestation and are 
not subjugated to free, open, and balanced debate and challenge.  Prevent underlines the 
desire to contain and challenge radicalization and thus minimize national security risks. 
Objective two of Prevent underscores the means by which professionals are to 
thwart the process of radicalization.  The primary method is through conjunction with the 
Channel program.  Channel is a police-coordinated, multi-agency partnership that 
“evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism” and that works 
“alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels.”68  Channel is a 
mechanism for assessing and supporting people who are being drawn into violent 
extremism or are being targeted by violent extremists.69  Through Prevent, teachers and 
school staff are to refer these individuals to a chief police officer who would then refer 
them to a panel of experts and practitioners.  This can only be done if there are 
“reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is vulnerable to being drawn into 
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terrorism.”70  The panel develops support packages for referred individuals based on an 
assessment of their vulnerability.  The most challenging portion of Channel revolves 
around the referral system; demarcating what behaviors and indicators should be taken to 
be a sign of vulnerability or radicalization has proven to be a feat for these professionals.  
Some of the indicators that Channel designates are expressed opinions in favor of 
violence and terrorism and against the rule of law and government; possession of or 
access to violent extremist literature and imagery or material regarding military training 
or weapons; behavioral changes like withdrawal from social atmospheres and hostility; 
and a history of involvement with extremist organizations.71  Educators and school staff 
are presented with some materials that explain these indicators and behaviors and what 
constitutes the need for referral.  The referral process is linear and follows the pattern of 
identification, screening referrals, preliminary assessments, multi-agency panels, and 
delivery of support.72  Individuals can be deemed as not at risk or vulnerable in both the 
screening referral and preliminary assessment stages.   
Ultimately, the UK wants sectors to be able to have effective responses to 
terrorism, and the government views education as a vital institution that prepares young 
people to challenge extremism and the ideology of terrorism.  In the most recent version 
of Prevent, the UK government delineates how primary schools, secondary schools, and 
higher education institutions should combat radicalization.  In primary and secondary 
schools, the UK Department of Education and the OSCT has funded programs that raise 
awareness of the risks from violent extremism and provide guidance on the development 
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of positive and inclusive rhetoric on democratic values and human rights with nearly 4.7 
million pounds overall and regionally 950 thousand pounds.73  Additionally, the 
Association of Chief Police Officers worked to produce the guidance document of 
“PREVENT, Police, and Schools” which aims to help police officers work with teachers 
and school staff.  From this program, the “Act Now” initiative emerged to help teachers 
and school staff understand debates that may be had in their classrooms and school 
settings through simulated debates on violent extremism.  The program “Watch Over 
Me” helped secondary schoolteachers discuss challenging topics like terrorism.  From 
these programs and initiatives, teachers have been provided with resources that they 
should use in effectuating their role in anti-radicalization and Prevent. 
In higher education, Prevent distinctly does not wish to limit or interfere with the 
free flow of ideas that champion higher education institutions and discussion.  Alongside 
Prevent research, the Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills identified forty 
English universities where there was particular concern or risk of radicalization or 
recruitment on campus, at which point the universities were given the opportunity to 
assess their ability to manage the risk.74  Subsequently, these universities were given 
intelligence briefings and small grants to further the work of Prevent.  Many of these 
universities now have a dedicated police officer on campus to advise on these issues.  
Major concerns about the skill and confidence of staff to deal with radicalization are still 
rampant in the higher education sector specifically.  Very few specific programs and 
initiatives have been enacted to aid higher educators in their determent of radicalization.   
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However, the Home Office has recently released an online e-learning training 
module, meant to address the fundamentals of Prevent.75  The training exercise addresses 
the roles that numerous individuals have in the program and tailors the eight parts to the 
individual that is participating, based on your geographic region, occupational sector, and 
role in that sector (e.g., primary school teacher, administrative staff, teaching assistant).  
Through the use of interactive exercises, the training emphasizes potential signs for 
radicalization, particularly noting the psychological factors such as emotions and 
behaviors that put people at risk.  While it does mention that the risk for radicalization is 
lower than for drug and alcohol abuse and peer pressure, it fails to consider the 
multifinality of the factors it uses.  Some of the behaviors and emotions that it says are 
signs of the radicalization process include absenteeism, isolation from friends and family, 
quick to anger, becoming detached or withdrawn, signs of stress, and unhealthy use of the 
internet.  These factors can all point to other things in a person’s life such as mental 
illness (i.e., depression and anxiety), abuse of some form, or addiction.  Just because a 
student may be expressing some of these factors does not indicate that they are being 
radicalized or are even at risk of radicalization.  Yet, the training requires you to put 
radicalization as a key factor in what is driving the actions of students in the case studies.  
Furthermore, the training lays out the process of radicalization but assumes that extremist 
viewpoints and thoughts lead to terrorism, a conveyor belt theory that is an inherent 
design flaw in not only this training module but Prevent as a whole.  The training lacks 
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grounded evidence and actions for teachers to take, instead emphasizing that they should 
use professional judgment and common sense and also consider the context of the 
actions. 
In November of 2017, the Home Office divulged what they described as 
experimental statistics around the success, demographics, and reasoning behind referrals 
within the Prevent program in the 2015-2016 fiscal year.76  According to these models, 
approximately 7,631 individuals were subject to referrals due to concerns that they were 
being drawn into terrorism, were being radicalized, or had been radicalized.  The 
education sector accounted for the most referrals (33%), while the police accounted for 
31%.  This finding clearly indicates that the two main sectors that Prevent is trying to 
bolster in their counter-radicalization efforts are educational institutions and the police.  
Of the 7,631 individuals referred, only 1,072, or 14%, were deemed suitable to be passed 
on to the Channel program.77  Of those 1,072 individuals, only 381 subsequently received 
support through the program of which 365 had left the Channel process after officials 
deemed their vulnerability as successfully reduced.  Of the initial 7,631, 4,997 (67%) 
were referred to Prevent for concerns related to Islamist extremism.78  Right wing 
extremism, other forms of extremism, and “unspecified” account for the remaining 33%.  
Of the 1,072 discussed at a Channel panel, 819 (76%) were there because of concerns of 
Islamist extremism, and 264 subsequently received Channel support. 
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Throughout Prevent, Channel, and CONTEST as a whole, upholding human 
rights seems to be at the apex of discussion.  Continually, CONTEST hinges its success 
in counterterrorism work on if it is “effective, proportionate and consistent with [the 
UK’s] commitment to human rights.”79  Prevent commits to protecting freedom of speech 
in a tolerant, welcoming, and safe environment.80  Channel puts human rights in the 
center of its support packages, exploring the idea that greater knowledge about “political 
engagement, civil challenge, human rights, social justice and citizenship” would be 
advantageous and beneficial to vulnerable individuals.81 However, the extent to which 
this is true is vigorously opposed by numerous institutions, public figures, non-
governmental organizations, and educators themselves.  The public backlash against 
these programs is tremendous and at the forefront after major attacks outmaneuver these 
enacted policies.  People begin to question the civil liberty-national security tradeoff and 
the efficacy of the programs if they are not doing what they are designed to do.  
According to Richard A. Posner, an American jurist and economist, “Rights should be 
curtailed to the extent that the benefits in greater security outweigh the costs in reduced 
liberty.”82  Thus, in times of national insecurity, people are willing to relinquish some of 
their civil liberties and human rights if it is in the name of national security.   
The highest point of contention revolves around the referral system and the 
environment that Prevent engenders.  Prevent forces teachers to subsume a dual post 
where they are doing their traditional job of educating their students but also are acting as 
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a surrogate and contact for the intelligence and security communities.  According to 
Aislinn O’Donnell, a professor at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 
educators should be autonomous from the security and intelligence agendas.83  The 
training that educators go through is inadequate at best since it is no more than a few 
hours of video on what is considered suspect behavior.  Russell Hobby, the general 
secretary of the National Association of Head Teachers, stated, “Teachers are not 
counter-terrorism experts, have no wish to be ancillary members of the security service 
and lack the training to do it well even if they did.”84  Moreover, schools do not know 
what their full obligations are and are concerned about being seen as taking action and 
complying.85 The combination of these two mindsets has “engendered a culture of over-
referral and excessive scrutiny.”  Prevent and Channel are causing young students to be 
fearful of exercising their rights to freedom of expression and belief for fear that what 
they say may be misconstrued as supporting violent extremism and terrorism.86  The most 
disconcerting point, though, is that this process could be utterly counter-productive.  As 
students feel restricted on what they can freely speak about in classroom settings, they 
gravitate towards having discussions on issues related to terrorism, religion, and identity 
outside of the classroom and online where simplistic narratives like those used by 
terrorist organizations are spouted and go unchallenged.  
Furthermore, there are inherent design problems in the structure of Prevent that 
critically damage its validity.  Since Prevent relies on educators to act as a first 
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correspondent for counterterrorism policy, many educators feel like they are being co-
opted to serve this mission and have subsequently objected.87  In March of 2016, the 
National Union of Teachers passed a motion rejecting Prevent, saying they would not act 
as the “Secret Service of the public sector.”  Also, Prevent leaves so much up to the 
discretion of the schools that there is no guarantee for consistency and predictability; 
there is an absence of clear instructions as to what form of intervention is appropriate and 
when a risk assessment is triggered.  Furthermore, the indicators of Channel often 
correlate poorly with potential terrorist activity and are overbroad in scope and 
ambiguous in meaning.  This causes over-referral without concrete justification.  In the 
2015-2016 fiscal year, 36% of the individuals referred to Prevent left the process 
requiring no further action, suggesting a gross over-referral without adequate cause or 
justification.88  Only 14% of those referred to Prevent were passed on to Channel. 
  The most intriguing design flaw though rests in the connection between 
extremism and terrorism.  Channel and Prevent assess the vulnerability of an individual 
becoming a terrorist by means of their association with extremism.89  It posits that 
extremism and terrorism are on a continuum and support for extremism is a reliable 
indicator for future participation in terrorism.  Interestingly enough, the movement and 
path from extremism to terrorism is what the UK defines as radicalization.  However, this 
linear approach is widely criticized.  Ben Emmerson QC, a UN Special Rapporteur on 
human rights and counterterrorism, more succinctly describes this path as “individualized 
and non-linear, with a number of common ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors but no single 
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determining feature.”90  Furthermore, Prevent defines extremism as opposed to so-called 
‘British values.’91  This definition is vague at best and fails to take into account the liquid 
and constantly reshaping British identity.  Some critics argue that this overly-simplistic 
understanding of “extreme” is McCarthyistic in nature and is further marginalizing the 
Muslim community in the UK.92 
In addition to the inherent design problems of Prevent, students and educators 
alike have dramatically voiced their opinions against Prevent and its implications for the 
student-teacher relationship. In 2015, the National Union of Students (NUS) called for a 
boycott of Prevent, citing its counter-radicalization strategy to monitor students and the 
subsequent impact on freedom of expression on campuses as its impetus.93  The NUS 
launched a national tour in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow, and Swansea, 
and the University and College Union—the largest trade union for lecturers and 
academics in higher education—backed the boycott, pledging support for any branch that 
decided to formally boycott the implementation of Prevent.  This boycott was part of the 
Students Not Suspects movement which campaigns against the discriminatory duties that 
affect ‘suspect’ communities.  Yusuf Hassan, the vice-president of student affairs of an 
umbrella group representing 15,000 Muslim students in higher education, said, “Terms 
such as radicalization have not been defined or quantified…It is not, nor should it be 
within the ability of a student or a lecturer to report on extremism or people showing 
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it.”94  Furthermore, Rizwaan Sabir, a specialist in counterterrorism at the Liverpool John 
Moores University, claims that the act creates a climate of fear, self-censorship and a 
danger that innocent people may be seen as future terrorists.   
Educators have also presented major concerns in regard to the effects that Prevent 
has had on their relationship with students and on the classroom environments it has 
created.  For O’Donnell, Prevent damages relations of trust and openness because of the 
alienation, disaffection, and disengagements that it imbues.95  She believes that if Prevent 
continues limiting free speech, it may drive those with radical views off campus and 
underground, countering its purpose.  How can we effectively combat radicalization in 
educational institutions if those people who are “vulnerable” are not there?  It has become 
increasingly difficult for educators and students alike to know what one is permitted to 
say and discuss in the classroom.  O’Donnell argues for a shift to the Greek concept of 
parrhesia, or fearless speech.96  Parrhesia is the ability to disclose courageously the truth 
about oneself to other people without the fear of repercussions.  Students need 
environments where they work through their views openly with contestation, reflection, 
and enquiry.  It allows for the exploration of these difficult topics but only when there is a 
symbiotic relationship of trust between the educator and the student.  Furthermore, 
educators cannot strive to directly change the world view of students by encouraging 
them to adopt a new world view.  Most students will resist and resent this; transformation 
should occur by creating the conditions for the world to open to the student.97  Imposition 
of an idea on students damages the delicate relationship of trust and the possibility of 
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creativity and autonomy on subject matter.  Students should regard education and the 
classroom as a space of open dialogue and free speech if Prevent is to garner 
transformation and questioning within that environment.   
Furthermore, there are clear instances where the counter-radicalization and 
deradicalization efforts of Prevent have ultimately failed.  Some of the perpetrators of 
both the June 2017 London Bridge terror attack and the Parsons Green subway bombing 
in September of the same year are known to have direct connections to the Prevent 
program.98  In June of 2017, three assailants drove a rented van into a crowd of 
pedestrians on the London Bridge and then used knives to attack patrons of restaurants 
and pubs in the Borough Market.  In September, a homemade bomb partially exploded in 
subway train at the Parsons Green station for which three assailants were arrested.  
Khuram Shazad Butt, a perpetrator in the June attack, and Ahmed Hassan, a perpetrator 
in the September attack, were both referred to Prevent for extremism and radicalization 
concerns.  So, what do these successful attacks say about Prevent?  Ultimately, the 
system has failed.  Radicalized terrorists are thwarting the system and successfully 
carrying out attacks even after referral.  Whether they were radicalized at the time of 
referral or not, it highlights immensely the need for more efficacious measures in 
determining how vulnerable someone may be to radicalization. 
With these human rights issues, design flaws, educator and public concerns, and 
failures of the system itself, how can CONTEST, Prevent, and Channel evolve to 
accommodate future changes in the context of educational institutions?  Many advocates 
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and educators have pushed for the development of curricula that prevents radicalization 
in a similar manner to how educational institutions currently combat drugs, gang 
violence, and alcohol.99  Often, discussion of terrorism, extremism, and radicalization can 
be a minefield for teachers because of prejudice among students, but that cannot detract 
from the role of an educator.  Teachers sometimes prefer to safeguard from potential 
prejudiced discussion that could occur rather than from potential terrorist attacks.100  
Thus, there needs to be more clarity on the expectations and requirements regarding this 
safeguarding and further on how teachers and educators address this.  A set of standards 
needs to be explicitly defined for educators’ obligations regarding extremism, and the 
government must ensure that teachers and school staff know what to do when they see 
signs of radicalization.   
Schools need to ensure balanced debate as well as freedom of speech.  Their 
environments should create spaces for sensitive questioning and exploration of issues that 
affect students’ daily lives.101  University staff must be aware of the decisions they make 
on guest lecturers and external speakers to ensure open environments but also to ensure 
that propagandistic material is not being spouted.  Student societies and universities 
should be given the right information and guidance to make these decisions correctly.102  
At the university level especially, the government needs to address the lack of 
engagement by schools and universities.  The reconstruction of the program so that it 
better aligns with the goals of educational institutions will aid this, but grants would also 
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incentivize engagement and implementation of Prevent and Channel.  Prevent also 
should ameliorate community cohesion by creating better links between schools, 
universities, colleges, local authorities, and community entities.  They should work to 
reduce the risk of exposure to extremist and terrorist ideology outside of school hours. 
Some of the greatest revisions need to focus on teacher training.  Regardless of 
teacher apprehension against the referral system of Prevent and Channel, it cannot be 
improved without adequate and ample training for teachers and school staff.  They must 
know how to react when they see signs of radicalization.  Current training only informs 
teachers of their duty under Prevent guidelines and does not include practical actions and 
detailed information.  First and foremost, specific indicators and behaviors need to be 
established if possible, and it cannot revert to generalities.  These indicators and 
behaviors need to have significant backing in psychological studies that indicate that 
these signs are more likely than not indicators for radicalization or risk of it.  Greater 
training time that is more than just a video should be devoted to educators; teachers and 
school staff should be attending workshops and seminars as well so that they are properly 
trained.  Furthermore, teachers must also feel as if they can speak freely and honestly in 
line with the idea of parrhesia without subordinating education to other agendas like 
those of security and counterterrorism.103 
Ultimately, the best path for the education-based counterterrorism strategies of 
Prevent is a humanitarian endeavor that seeks to highlight discussion and learning.  When 
educational institutions are used as a means for finding the radicalized or individuals 
vulnerable to radicalization, it undermines the fundamental principle of education.  It 
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subordinates the original intent of learning to a security precept where educators are more 
of a watchdog than anything else.  It is also negligent to replace traditional education with 
education designed to inculcate a certain ideology.  Samuel Walters, speaking of terrorist 
organizations in Afghanistan, says, “If the organizations are approaching the recruitment 
of new terrorists through the…technique of taking in a somewhat disenfranchised youth 
and slowly ‘grooming’ them through meetings and propaganda-like education, then an 
opposite form of education could be a viable counter action to recruitment activities.”104  
While this is referring to counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, this method can be 
applied to Western, national counterterrorism strategy as well.  Even though extremists 
and terrorists focus on propaganda, recruitment at a young age, and social organizations 
at schools and universities, a humanitarian, anti-propaganda approach will be 
advantageous to combatting the ideological challenge of terrorism.  Furthermore, 
providing every individual access to education that effectively fosters an environment of 
debate, critical thinking and enquiry, and openness towards complex issues like 
extremism and terrorism will reduce the possibility of recruitment to a brand of 
religiously-inspired terrorism that rests outside of and distinct from the rest of the 
religious community.105  Drawing from established and developed pedagogical discourse 
on anti-racism, educators could replicate these methods and then apply similar techniques 
to anti-terrorism discourse.  Racism and terrorism parallel each other as they are both 
seen as sensitive issues, and since anti-racism education is more pedagogically developed 
and ensured than that for terrorism, it would be a good starting point to apply effective 
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methods directly into the classroom.  This humanitarian approach to education-based 
counterterrorism will give students more scope to engage in critical and academic 
discussion that traces the roots and causes of terrorism. 
Overall, CONTEST, Prevent, and Channel have undermined a crucial aspect of 
basic human rights that is only acceptable in the most minute of circumstances.  
Prevent’s design problems question how well this strategy can be effectively 
implemented in sectors like education where there is severe backlash from students, 
educators, and staff alike.  Prevent, to them, makes suspect an entire community while 
also limiting rights of expression and religion; David Anderson QC said, “There is a 
strong feeling in Muslim communities…that Prevent is, if not a spying programme, then 
is at least a programme that is targeted on them.”106  The intense outcry and disapproval 
of the program has spurred the need for a revision of the program that ameliorates clear 
guidance and curricula on expectations and implementation, the autonomy of the 
educational space, and the teacher training of the guidelines.  Some have even called for 
its being rebranded as the ‘Engage Programme’.  These education strategies, though, 
should migrate to a more humanitarian approach that seeks to emphasize the function of 
education.   
The Media 
Publicity has long been a fundamental factor of terrorism but has gained explosive 
usage and clout with the rise in new media technologies.107  Since 9/11 specifically, the 
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unfortunate role of the media has been to promulgate this ideological factor of terrorism, 
whether knowingly or unknowingly.108  Terrorist organizations disperse information and 
propaganda through myriad media outlets, emphasizing their use of social media 
platforms especially.  However, according to Philip Seib, “If terrorist organizations draw 
their support from a large public, they should not be allowed to access that public without 
competition from those who want to bring terrorism to an end.”109  Often overlooked, the 
media has also played an integral part in the countering of terrorism, utilized as a key 
counterterrorism bulwark by numerous agencies and governments against terrorist 
organizations but also as a key factor in protecting national security.   
The greatest pushback to the implementation and utilization of such a behemoth 
of an industry into the counterterrorism enterprise, though, comes from questions 
regarding basic human rights.  The intersection of counterterrorism strategy and the 
media aims to protect the national integrity of a country and its people but must also 
hinge around the idea of civil liberties enunciated in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.  After major attacks such as the 2004 Madrid Bombings, the 2005 
London Bombings, and the November 2015 Paris Attacks, national insecurity and the 
idea of national insecurity induces Western governments to encroach on basic civil 
liberties like the rule of law and freedom of speech while the media’s subservient and 
fearmongering tactics further perpetuate this insecurity, demeaning its role in public and 
governmental oversight.  Thus, as terrorism remains a viable and advantageous option for 
several transnational organizations, the future of counterterrorism must, at least partially, 
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root itself in ethical considerations of media-based strategies that venerate and sustain the 
information-promulgation function of the media. 
 As the world has become more interconnected and information has become more 
widely available to the public, the media has essentially become another cog in the liberal 
democratic machine that runs many Western states.  It allows the public to have greater 
and more direct access to the process of democracy and the policies enacted to protect 
them.  While the traditional balance of power in liberal democracies falls to the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, the media is effectively 
another major actor in this balance, serving as a voice for the public.  Therefore, how the 
media and the government frame terrorism to the public determines whether terrorism 
and terrorists will destroy more than just lives and buildings but also the foundations of 
our rights and freedoms.  Jack Snyder of Columbia University states, “Democratic 
regimes make attractive targets for terrorist violence by national liberation movements 
precisely because they are accountable to a cost-conscious electorate.”110  Conclusive 
evidence suggests that the reporting of terrorist operations and attacks by news agencies 
leads to the perpetuation of violence, especially since terrorist organizations use these 
agencies and their own media to promote their agendas.111  This phenomenon seriously 
questions if terrorists should be given the “oxygen of publicity.”112  Alternatively, the 
media has a basic right and a civic duty to inform the public of these committed 
atrocities, acting as the guardian and distributer of information to the modern masses.  
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Political communication between governmental policy makers and the public situates 
mass media as the gate-keeper of access to news and to these participating parties.113  The 
key is to find the middle point where the media is able to institute freedom of speech and 
of the press but does not engender an environment where people are deprived of their 
freedom from fear.  
 A recent study by Michael Jetter confirmed the horrific truth behind media 
representation of terrorism and other acts of terror:  more news attention predicts future 
attacks.114  News attention functions as an incentive for terrorists and the propagation of 
their objectives which explains the recent exponential augmentation in suicide attacks, 
lone-actor attacks, and more large-scale organized attacks.  Unfortunately, this 
correlation also functions in reverse as terrorism causes news attention, drafting countries 
into an inflationary spiral where terror is ever-perpetuated.  His findings thus challenge 
how the media needs to effectively operate in this reciprocal realm.  Jetter enunciated his 
final conclusion from the study in an interview with The Guardian where he stated, 
“What this article is suggesting is that we may need to rethink the sensationalist coverage 
of terrorism and stop providing terrorists a media platform.”115  Jetter undoubtedly 
suggests that the media is not engendering societies to have freedom from fear but rather 
is following a fearmongering approach. 
 This sensationalist approach that has characterized numerous news cycles recently 
plays a particularly insidious role in terrorism framing for the public.  For minority 
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groups, sensationalized media representation has led to the idea of “suspectification” 
which hopes to detect “suspect” individuals and behaviors in society.116  However, this 
has translated into overgeneralization by both the public and news agencies, leading to 
“suspect communities.”  Many journalists in the media feel the need to distance 
themselves from political violence by deploying strong, pejorative language like “evil,” 
“fanatics,” and “barbaric” to the perpetrators of violence, and they also have frequently 
juxtaposed the press coverage of moderates with that of extremists which unintentionally 
has begun to blur the boundaries between the two groups.117  This has caused massive 
backlash against moderates who are found in these supposed “suspect communities,” 
with many claiming that the media is in some way responsible for the verbal and physical 
abuse they encounter in everyday situations.118  These “suspect communities” do not 
have a freedom from discrimination because of the rhetoric of the media.  Looking back 
at the data from Prevent referrals, Muslims in the UK had a 1-in-500 chance of being 
referred in 2015, which is approximately forty times more likely than non-Muslims.119  
Furthermore, Muslim communities in particular have admitted that there is a state of 
fearfulness which has promoted divergent responses of feelings of alienation to various 
forms of politicization in Muslims.   
 For majority groups (or terrorist outgroups which may be a more apt description), 
sensationalized media of terrorism has actually perpetuated Islamophobia.  When 
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networks continually cover terror attacks in grandiose fashions, psychological distress in 
individuals causes emotional and mental imbalances, prejudicial reactionary principles, 
and exclusionist attitudes to evolve rampantly.120  Following a terrorist attack, 
psychological distress is incredibly high in people who view the attack as an attack 
against their ingroup, and sensationalized coverage only exacerbates this effect.  This 
effect has been evident since at least the 9/11 attacks when the newest wave of terrorism 
commenced and when Islamist extremism came to the forefront.  While it is unfair to say 
that the media is the cause of Islamophobia as psychological studies indicate that it is the 
attack itself that burgeons it, it is a fair assessment to say that the media has been an 
indiscriminate disseminator and perpetuator of the idea.121  News agencies do a poor job 
of depicting what Islam is, portraying it as “entirely unidimensional and monolithic;” 
they have avoided the diversity and difference of opinion that exists within Islam and 
Islamism.122  It unfortunately has led to unfettered racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia 
in Western societies. 
 However, the media cannot stop reporting terrorism on its own accord and cannot 
be ordered to stop reporting terrorism by the government or other overseeing 
organizations.  These actions would infringe upon the freedom of the press, and the 
media is a vital part of the information exchange necessary to ratify the social contract 
between the government and the public.  In liberal democracies, media gate-keepers 
permit and promote the dissemination of information and communication between the 
                                                 
120 Robin Goodwin, Krzysztof Kaniasty, Shaojing Sun, and Menachem Ben-Ezra, "Psychological 
distress and prejudice following terror attacks in France," Journal of psychiatric research (2017), 111. 
121 Christopher Allen, "Islamophobia in the media since September 11th," Exploring 
Islamophobia: Deepening our understanding of Islam and Muslims (University of Westminster, 2001), 2. 
122 Allen, “Islamophobia in the media,” 3. 
 47 
citizenry and the elected and appointed government officials.  Brigitte Nacos designates 
this information exchange as the “Triangle of Political Communication” (see figure 1).123  
The “Triangle” effectively connects the public to the government yet unfortunately 
systematically publicizes the propagandistic messages of terrorism to the other parties in 
the “Triangle” as well.  Even though terrorists may exploit the fundamental tenets and 
responsibilities of the media, the government cannot polarize this phenomenon by 
restricting the freedom of expression and speech that the media is ensured. 
 
Figure 1.  Terrorism, the Triangles of Political Communication, and the Internet in Brigitte Nacos, 
“Terrorism/counterterrorism and media in the age of global communication” (2006), 4. 
 
 Consequently, the media’s function rests in a precarious state of limbo.  A liberal 
democracy requires that the government furnish the public with the best possible 
information so that the public can form opinions.124  This social contract begins to 
disintegrate though when leaders and news sources do not inform and educate the public 
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with factual, applicable information or when they use fear and media manipulation as a 
political tool.125 How then does the media successfully work in conjunction with the 
government to address counterterrorism while also being a window for the public and for 
defenders of human rights to speak, all while not following fearmongering tactics?  But 
more importantly, has today’s media adhered to this ideal etiquette? 
 In initiating media-based counterterrorism strategy, the media seems to follow the 
inundation of public outbursts of patriotism and subsequently emulates it at the expense 
of its watchdog responsibilities.126  Media representation of counterterrorism revolves 
almost exclusively on the leaders of the nation, propagating a “rally-‘round-the-flag 
phenomenon” where the press places extraordinary attention on the rhetoric of leaders in 
times of crises.  This focalization of news attention gives state leaders the clout to affect 
and set the news agenda of the perceived crisis, and that power is where the curtailing of 
civil liberties begins.  However, not solely limited to and caused by this governmental 
influence, the media also has an insatiable desire to concentrate only on the militaristic 
counterterrorism responses rather than non-violent methods being implemented.  This 
voracious appetite for sensational news conjoined with governmental influence causes the 
media to avert “reporting about…encroachments on civil liberties and human rights.”127 
 The relationship between the military, military secrets, the media, and the First 
Amendment has been consistently precarious in eras where national security is a concern.  
At times, the relationship between the national security apparatus and the press is 
symbiotic; other times, it is antagonistic.128  Both systems though have the tantamount 
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goals of protecting democratic values and national freedom, but the extent to which they 
disseminate and exchange information is what provides the symbiotic-antagonistic 
nature.  After the development of the Sidle Commission during the Grenada Operation in 
1983, the military approached its press interactions with the ideology that “it [was] 
essential that the US news media cover US military operations to the maximum degree 
possible consistent with mission security and the safety of US forces.”129  After major 
military operations in the late twentieth century, it was easy to discern that mutual 
antagonism and distrust were not in the best interests of the media, the military, nor the 
American people.  This newfound principle of partial, understood cooperation continues 
today in the media and military operations and relations.  Thus, journalists and news 
organizations today must find the balance of patriotism and professionalism in their 
coverage of counterterrorism strategy in the military so as not to be a detriment to 
national security but to be an instrument to the tasks of citizenship in regard to the social 
contract.130  
 Following 9/11, the Bush Administration implemented numerous security 
measures to combat terrorism which the media magnified disproportionately.  The media 
tended to highlight only the shocking, sensationalized, and disconcerting news of the day.  
For example, after the introduction of the Homeland Security Advisory System, networks 
covered the raising of the alert system from yellow to orange in a headliner position.131  
The three major news networks—CBS, ABC, and NBC—spent on average five minutes 
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and twenty seconds on this news segment. 132  Conversely, when the alert was reduced 
from orange to yellow ten days later, these networks only spent one minute and thirty-
four seconds covering it, and the majority of these segments were not in headliner 
positions.  The media effectively downplayed the lowering of these alerts or did not cover 
them at all, keeping the fear of terrorism alive in the minds of Americans who did not pay 
close attention to the news cycle.  This further supports the insinuation that the media 
generated and contributed to what Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro referred to as a 
“culture of hysteria” where fear conditioned Americans to rally around the president 
while silencing possible opponents.133   
 Furthermore, in addition to the military responses in Afghanistan, the Bush 
Administration curtailed civil liberties with the drafting, legislation, and implementation 
of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) which expanded the “federal 
government’s surveillance and intelligence gathering powers.”134  Rather than focusing 
on this curbing of civil liberties and human rights infringements though, news focused on 
the process by which it was being put through Congress and subsequently enacted.135  
The media relinquished its role as an information window, avoiding the complex legal 
issues and privacy violations that the USA Patriot Act presented.  News agencies decided 
to express their patriotism by only agreeing with the government rather than posing 
questions, raising concerns, and voicing dissent which are more essential to the national 
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interests of the public.136  It chose to report only rather than to examine and did not 
provide holistic information for the public, floundering in its role as the gate-keeper.   
 As the USA Patriot Act encroached on basic civil liberties and human rights like 
the right to privacy and the freedom from discrimination, the Bush Administration also 
used its clout to set the media agenda, preventing free discussion and questioning of these 
counterterrorism measures.137  The media gave priority attention to members of the 
Administration and other prominent figures in the terrorism and counterterrorism arenas.  
When reporting on civil liberties encroachment and the USA Patriot Act, media coverage 
had a formulaic design where an anchor would give a neutral description of the issue at 
hand, followed by someone arguing in favor of the issue (typically President George 
Bush or Attorney General John Ashcroft) and ending with only a mention of opposition 
from organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union.138  Additionally, when it was 
the administration’s intention and as long as they gave press conferences, speeches, and 
interviews, news agencies were more than willing to give them frequent and prominent 
coverage which would permit that agenda setting and news domination by the 
government.139 
 However, the media did move itself into a more subjective arena after the 
atrocities at the Abu Ghraib Prison emerged in 2004.140  The media regained some of its 
independence from the governmental agenda setting as it and the public began to 
question the security-civil liberties trade-off.  In times of great threat, the public is willing 
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to consent to curbs of civil liberties for the sake of enhanced collective and individual 
security, and “the greater people’s sense of threat, the lower their support for civil 
liberties.”141  Therefore, when the Abu Ghraib brutalities emerged, people’s sense of 
threat from 9/11 had diminished drastically, and they no longer felt the need to have such 
a degree of curtailment.  Yet, this shift had too little coverage of the appalling violations 
of civil liberties and human rights of particular groups too late.  As Justice Potter Stewart 
wrote, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an 
enlightened citizenry…For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, 
and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the first amendment.  For without an 
informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people.”142  A vibrant, free press 
holds the government to account and is thus vitally important to the well-being of our 
nation and its human rights record.143  The media must maintain its freedom of speech 
and press to allow people the information to protect the values of democracy and human 
rights alike regardless of political clout and sway. 
 By strict adhesion to the information promulgation role, the media will be another 
form of checks and balances for the government, reporting and voicing the dissenting 
and/or agreeing opinions of the public.  In achieving this role, news agencies must be 
aware of the dangers of characterizing communities as “harboring extremists, responsible 
for solving the problem of terrorism, and split between the law-abiding, moderate 
majority and the criminal, extremist minority” and must avoid extreme and pejorative 
language and terminology in its reporting.144  This fourth actor in the checks and balances 
                                                 
141 Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro, 68. 
142 Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro, 92. 
143 Dozier, Crowley, Klaidman, and Mazzetti, "Counterterrorism and the Media.” 
144  Hickman, Thomas, Silvestri, and Nickels, “’Suspect Communities?’,” 27. 
 53 
system emphasizes what is known as public diplomacy whereby a greater entity such as a 
government, a multinational corporation, or a non-governmental organization reaches out 
to the public.145  The media facilitates a large portion of the dialogue evident in public 
diplomacy, especially newer forms of media like social media and YouTube.146  Today’s 
public has gradually transitioned from an “authority-driven” world to an “experience-
driven” world, accentuating how the availability of information has led to unprecedented 
personal independence in regards to news.  Public diplomacy though exists as a prime 
tool in the counterterrorism toolbox.  A loose mélange of new and traditional media 
platforms permits it to guarantee a comprehensive reach of efforts as it informs the public 
while also countering the terrorism agenda with equally clear and appealing rhetoric.   
 But how effectively has the Western world used this tactic?  Former U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates aptly encompassed in 2007 the US’s success in public 
diplomacy in today’s web-based world: 
Public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at 
communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and a culture, 
about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals.  It is just plain 
embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its message on the internet than 
America.  As one foreign diplomat asked a couple of years ago, “How has one man in a 
cave managed to out-communicate the world’s greatest communication society?”  Speed, 
agility, and cultural relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing 
U.S. strategic communications.147 
 
Today’s terrorists make extraordinary use of the new media, further accentuating the idea 
that terrorism evolves ahead of counterterrorism.  Groups like AQ and IS have turned to 
social media for propaganda, psychological warfare, and weapons tutorials since it allows 
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anyone to publish or access information.148  Often, it is comparatively inexpensive yet 
significantly more wide-reaching; in 2013, the average American user spent 23 hours 
emailing, texting, and using social media or other forms of communication.  This new 
version of media allows terrorist organizations to approach their intended audience 
directly instead of waiting for their audience to come to them (as was the case in older 
forms of media with strictly websites).  Consider the following call to action on a jihadi 
online forum calling for a “Facebook Invasion”: 
Facebook is a great idea, and better than the forums.  Instead of waiting for people to 
[come to you so you can] inform them, you go to them and teach them!…[I] mean, if you 
have a group of 5,000 people, with the press of a button you [can] send them a 
standardized message.  I entreat you, by God, to begin registering for Facebook as soon 
as you [finish] reading this post.  Familiarize yourselves with it.  This post is a seed and a 
beginning, to be followed by serious efforts to optimize our Facebook usage.  Let’s start 
distributing Islamic jihadi publications, posts, articles, and pictures.  Let’s anticipate a 
reward from the Lord of the Heavens, dedicate our purpose to God, and help our 
colleagues.149 
 
The Western world has witnessed a modernization of terrorism that targets the people 
with whom public diplomacy is supposed to communicate.   
 For public diplomacy to work, Western democracies must communicate on all 
media platforms, both new and old, more effectively and more widely than terrorist 
organizations.  They must provide “counterprogramming to offset the message of 
proponents of hatred and violence.”150  The Western world must be a fierce competitor to 
terrorist organizations to deter any support they may be attempting to garner.  It must 
affirm values that challenge the legitimacy of terrorism as an effective means to a 
political, ideological, or religious goal.  In a report by the British Research, Information, 
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and Communication Unit of the Home Office, the UK called for a governmental targeting 
of the AQ narrative which “combines fact, fiction, emotion, and religion and manipulates 
discontent about local and international issues.”151  This narrative is accommodating and 
flexible, allowing terrorist organizations to exploit an array of situations and grievances 
that turn people towards radicalization.  Well-designed public diplomacy can reach large 
numbers of the political public and can challenge terrorism at its base.  Public diplomacy 
can dispute the narratives of terrorist organizations and proactively deter terrorism and 
radicalization.  According to Joseph Nye, “Democratic leaders must use soft or attractive 
power to disseminate a positive narrative about globalization and the prospects for a 
better future that attracts moderates and counters the poisonous jihadist narratives on the 
Web.”152 
 Ultimately, the public will either deepen their trust in governmental abilities to 
protect them or will become disillusioned, calling upon the social contract as a 
benchmark by which the government should begin to abide again.  The public will 
witness a shift from hard power toward more political approaches, designed to offset 
terrorist messages.  While this takes a more governmentally oriented direction, it will 
allow endorsement of the Islam of peace by moderate Muslims as opposed to the Islam of 
extremism and will diminish the fearmongering capacity of the media.  Thus, the media 
will be a force in guarding democratic values of transparency, freedom, and openness and 
guarding against governmental abuse of power in attempting to protect the nation and 
secure freedom from fear.153  Two truths exist in media that must be upheld in order to 
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protect journalistic rights and the self-evident rights of the public.  To guard these 
democratic values and human rights, the media and journalists must “stay vigilant, 
protecting their rights and obligations to keep the public informed and leaders 
accountable”.154  Second, journalists cannot forget that rights are a necessary component 
of a free democratic society and that they have a responsibility to keep that society safe 
and secure by what it reports, further iterating the need to find the middle ground between 
unfettered freedom of expression in the press and freedom from fear. 
 Due to the prevalent and extant nature of terrorism in the Western world, national 
insecurity remains a critical concern for the Western world as they attempt to stabilize, 
through effective, efficient, and ethical methods, a citizenry wrought with fear.  Media 
exploitation and sensationalization of violence and terrorism as a form of public 
entertainment only exacerbate this problem and the civil liberties issues.  Ultimately, the 
human rights infringement of several nations and the media’s fearmongering question the 
efficacy of these supposed tactics, highlighting the necessity for novel, positive, and 
successful strategies.  As Richard A. Posner posits, “only with the benefit of hindsight 
can a reaction be separated into proper and excess layers.”155  Posner eloquently depicts 
the unfortunate nature of actions controlled by the fear of terrorism that plague 
counterterrorism response and strategy where methods are excessive and rudimentary at 
best.  The media must overcome its blind, corrupt watchdog mentality so as to imbue an 
environment where counterterrorism strategy can effectively work while promulgating 
information for human rights and human rights advocacy, regardless of governmental 
action, inaction, and sway. 
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Future Interplay 
 Globalization undeniably dominates the world today, and the key to effective 
counterterrorism strategy is a proper utilization of resources.  Thus, counterterrorism 
should reflect the global order in which it finds itself.  Nation-states must look to the 
recent past to understand what the best responses are to the current terrorist situation and 
to understand how best to maintain the nonnegotiable aspects of human rights.  They 
cannot limit themselves to their isolated experiences; the interrelatedness of liberal 
democracies can afford crucial insight into truisms and successes.  In addition to this 
multilateral cooperation, cosmopolitan self-determination allows the public citizenry to 
have a more nuanced influence as “leaders construct national interest in accordance with 
the needs of their own citizenry, guided by accountability to internalized universal 
principles—rather than by hegemonic aspirations.”156 
 Human rights remain a vital component of a sustainable defense of the citizenry 
and democratic political community.  In addition, the construction of national security 
under the lens of human rights will not be an individualistic endeavor for nation states.157  
Multilateral cooperation encompasses the future of liberal democracies’ battle against 
terrorism.  Nation states will need to work together to understand the complexities of 
counterterrorism that cherish and nurture human rights protection.  Knowledge through 
this meaningful multilateralism will promote sustainable human security that overcomes 
the excessive feeling of vulnerability in international terror and provides nation states 
with an intricate framework for resolving underlying conflict.158  National insecurity 
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cannot act as a hindrance to liberal democratic states in their pursuit of effective 
counterterrorism strategies. 
 In liberal democracies, the fundamental precepts revolve around the commitment 
to freedom and openness.159  Thus, any counterterrorism strategy implemented must 
parallel the foundational principles of the governmental structure.  By embracing a 
democratic national security process, the state maintains democratic rule of law, 
transparency, and participation and protects citizens from misguided or ill-informed 
policies.160  Liberal democracies cannot fall prey to the terroristic psychological goals of 
public intimidation and overreaction by the government.  After the 9/11 attacks and after 
the US began to limit certain civil liberties, Osama bin Laden said, “So I say that freedom 
and human rights in America have been sent to the guillotine with no prospect of return, 
unless these values are quickly reinstated.  The government will take the American 
people and the West in general to a choking life, into an unsupportable hell.”161  The US 
did not withstand the pressure from the security threats that it felt and regrettably fulfilled 
the objectives of bin Laden and AQ.  Governing bodies must focus on safety measures 
that are minimally intrusive and highly productive in terms of public protection and 
cannot lose civil liberties as a result of public authorities failing to respond to the needs of 
the public.162 
 As noted by Osama bin Laden above, common culture and threat bind Western 
liberal democracies together, especially in their pursuit of counterterrorism.  The 
interplay of individual nation-states should amplify the interplay of the three entities 
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examined in this paper.  Countries can learn from the mistakes and successes of other 
countries in their respective counterterrorism operations.  Two such examples of this are 
Norway’s responses to the 2011 lone-wolf attacks by Anders Breivik and France’s 
responses to the 2015 Paris Bombings.  On July 22, 2011, Breivik killed 77 people at a 
youth camp run by the Labour Party in Norway.163  Post-9/11 but pre-22 July, Norway 
was rather passive on its counterterrorism measures and policies.  It often assumed the 
policies enacted at a supranational level that were more of a reflection of American 
ideology than Norwegian ideology.  However, after the attacks, Norway undertook more 
definitive and active measures in combatting terrorism that were distinct from traditional 
views on counterterrorism.  The Norwegian government transitioned to counterterrorism 
measures that focused on compliance, solidarity, moral obligation, and precaution.  
Following the attacks, Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg enunciated that Norway sought to 
meet terrorism with more openness and democracy but not with naïveté.164  Because of 
this sentiment, it was doubtful that Norway would pursue a new direction of 
counterterrorism policies that had the possibility of infringing on civil liberties, an ideal 
held at the core of the socialist government.  Norway was more likely, however, to 
implement further the international measures that were already in place in Norwegian 
government and society.   
 Norway took into consideration the actions of the US government after 9/11.  It 
maintained a balance of increased national security policy but preserved the civil liberties 
that its citizenry had.  It studied how the US responded and acted in reflection of that.  
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One of the most intriguing points of the Norwegian response was the public response to 
the attacks.  While the Norwegians did show extreme levels of patriotism and solidarity 
and a regard for national ideals like Americans did after 9/11, the push for a vengeful 
response was lacking and appeared to be largely absent.  This last point comes in direct 
opposition to the response of the majority of the American public.  This can potentially 
be attributed to ideological differences in the motives of the culprits.  Islamist extremists 
of AQ perpetrated 9/11 while a far-right extremist perpetrated 22 July.  However, cultural 
differences may be a better explanation for the disparate reactions.  H.D.S Greenway, a 
journalist at The Boston Globe, explains this stance by emphasizing the innate nature for 
conflict resolution over military intervention of the Norwegians as the primary factor for 
the disparity.165  Future research that compares and explains the tendency of Norway to 
follow approaches rooted in openness and democracy would be beneficial for future 
responses in Western democracies. 
 More apt though is the response of France and more broadly the EU to the Paris 
and Brussels attacks.  Their responses had extreme semblance to the responses of the US 
after 9/11.  Following 9/11, the US increased government surveillance, targeted certain 
communities, redoubled military efforts internationally, and adopted the USA Patriot Act.  
Following the November Paris Attacks, France and the EU saw the targeting of an entire 
community, specifically the Molenbeek community in Brussels which has been 
considered a jihadist safe haven in Europe due to the support shown by some residents.166  
France and the EU have also redoubled their military efforts in Syria following the 
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attacks.  Additionally, France introduced a bill reminiscent of the USA Patriot Act into 
the French Parliament.  An important fact to note though is that even though France 
adopted such similar measures in 2015, many socialist French authorities were skeptical 
after 9/11 of the US approach.  It was a perfunctory action that did not consider the 
mistakes of the US counterterrorism approach.  France had 14 years to observe the 
success of the US and should have built off of that in their application of counterterrorism 
measures.  Western liberal democracies have to learn from each other; common, reflex-
like reactions cannot dictate nor mire down the counterterrorism response policy.   
Mohamedou lays out this explanation in the following quotation: 
…When Western democracies are attacked, they tend to react in this way which is to think of [the 
attack] as an existential threat as opposed to looking at it as a political or policy threat. And in 
painting it that way, I think that the French administration was able to echo some of that language 
by saying this is about our way of life, this is about us and someone.  And many people don’t 
agree with that.  This was not necessarily that reasoning that should have been adopted early on.  
This is mostly about discreet policies that could be identified.  Because if you paint it that way, 
you are in fact mirroring, sort of, the civilizational talk of your enemy, painting with such big 
brushes. 167 
 
This mimicry fascinatingly reveals the dominant approach to securitization in the 
Western world.   Western states must consider the recent history and experiences of other 
countries.  Our world is not limited to individual states but is a cosmopolitan array of 
states that support each other in numerous ways.  In terms of terrorism and 
counterterrorism, states can diagnosis the relative successes and mistakes that other states 
make and can then apply measures and policies that circumvent the mistakes and 
capitalize the successes.  Documents like the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
underscore the collective and cooperative nature of counterterrorism strategies. 168  
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Liberal democracies cannot function completely autonomously; they must depend on the 
interrelation that they share with each other.  The collective values, norms, and histories 
concerning terrorism highlight democracy’s status as a strong structure for a long-term 
response to terror through “reliable information, sophisticated understanding of structural 
causes and the global context, effective options for the control of violence, and 
international support.”169 
 More importantly than just the interrelatedness of Western liberal democracies, 
states also should acknowledge the utility of the interaction of the range of 
counterterrorism strategies that they possess.  Intelligence, education, and media framing 
all emphasize vital parts of democratic paradigms and systems.  Intelligence highlights 
the actions of governments within counterterrorism strategy.  Intelligence remains the 
most important part of deterring terrorism and will continue to be the foremost strategy.  
Governments, especially those of liberal democracies, have a national security precept 
that they are expected to uphold due to the social contract that dictates democratic 
governance.  If people contend that security is a universal individual right, the foundation 
of national security and counterterrorism would be the protection of the individual from 
external threats and state violence.170  Intelligence institutions and their operations allow 
states to proactively deter, thwart, and combat attacks that terrorist organizations are 
plotting, thus actively working to ensure security for individuals.  Intelligence operations 
will remain the key component to fighting terrorist attacks, heralding back to traditional 
counterterrorism strategy.171 
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 However, terrorism has expanded and evolved.  No longer is terrorism simply the 
planned and premeditated actions of a specific terrorist organization and of dispatched 
foreign nationals.  Radicalization and lone-wolf terrorism have diverged from traditional 
terrorism; they characterize the new tactics of terrorist organizations.  This is the realm 
where educational institutions and proper media framing of terrorism and 
counterterrorism seem to be advantageous to counterterrorism strategies.  As for 
education strategies, they must be proactive.  Prevent focuses significantly on the 
aftermath of radicalization and then addressing this problem; it is more of a de-
radicalization mechanism.172  While it has stipulated the need for preventing people from 
being drawn into terrorism, the UK government has allocated more guidelines, funding, 
and training to detecting radicalization and stopping or reversing it than for prevention.  
Future educational strategies must recognize and capitalize on anti-radicalization 
measures more so than deradicalization measures.  Educational strategies like Prevent 
bring the public into the realm of counterterrorism.  Inclusive rhetoric by public figures 
such as police officers, school teachers, and professors challenges marginalization effects 
that people may feel, effects that have the potential of turning people towards 
radicalization.  Radicalization targets the disillusioned which is most effectively hindered 
by day-to-day interactions.  Intelligence is not able to effectively prevent, detect, and 
deter radicalization; lone-actor terrorism does not have a network for intelligence to 
track, and radicalization is such an individualized and psychological phenomenon that it 
would require copious amounts of human intelligence to adequately cover.173   The public 
thus has an active role in the anti-radicalization element of counterterrorism. 
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 Furthermore, proper and ethical media framing also plays a vital role in 
counterterrorism endeavors.  The media is one of the principal entities in democratic 
societies, promulgating information to the public.  While some argue that news agencies 
have resorted to sensationalized approaches that only seek ratings, the media is also the 
chief window of information for the public.  Sensationalized news propagates inaccurate 
representations of communities, and when sensationalizing Islamist terrorism, Muslim 
and Arab communities fall into the suspectification effect and the repercussions of 
Islamophobia.174  The alienation and disenfranchisement that Muslims feel can lead to 
different responses, yet politicization and radicalization is a real consequence of unethical 
reporting that knowingly or unknowingly stigmatizes a community as a whole.  Thus, the 
media should frame terrorism and counterterrorism operations in a light that protects the 
sanctity of the information exchange of the media while also promoting clear delineations 
between moderates and extremes.   
 These three institutions represent fundamental components of democracies.  
Intelligence symbolizes the government; education the public; and then the media is a 
key component in and of itself.  Thus, counterterrorism strategy that utilizes these three 
institutions will address and employ a wide range of strategies that is not limited to one or 
the other.  It is a well-versed, multifaceted approach that considers the quotidian 
interactions of individuals while also properly using the resources it has.  However, this 
approach is not an exhaustive combination of democratic institutions.  Further strategies 
should seek to include other institutions, particularly private ones like multinational 
corporations, non-governmental organizations, and even religious organizations.  
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Terrorism cannot only be framed as a governmental and security agency focus.  By 
framing terrorism in this way, it limits the responses to these institutions only, 
legitimizing the idea that terrorism can and should only be addressed by professionals in 
these arenas.  However, terrorism is more largely a societal issue that melds state and 
society.  Terrorism targets the citizenry, and thus counterterrorism should include the 
citizenry.  The citizenry and public plays a massive role in the inclusive rhetoric that 
counterprograms radicalization. 
 Ultimately, counterterrorism cannot be singular.  It must include as many 
possibilities and institutions as possible that attempt to mitigate the effects of terrorism.  
Multilateral, pluralist policies and strategies will combat terrorism with a portfolio of 
responses that seek to address all aspects of the terrorist regime from financing to 
operations to recruitment.  Particularly, counterterrorism must deepen international 
coordination and communication to outmatch the transnational characteristics that 
terrorism currently has.  Western counterterrorism strategies must push to become one 
step ahead of modern terrorism.  Proactivity will be the most effective paradigm in 
counterterrorism strategy since it seeks to address terrorism and protect from it before it 
has the chance to arise.    
 66 
Bibliography 
 
 
Primary Sources 
 
“Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program.” US Department of State Archive. Accessed March 
6, 2018.  https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16885.htm  
 
"E-Learning Training on Prevent." Accessed March 28, 2018. 
https://www.elearning.prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk/. 
 
U.K. Association of Chief Police Officers. Channel: Supporting individuals vulnerable to 
recruitment by violent extremists. Home Office, 2010. 
 
U.K. Home Office. Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. 12 February 2015. 
 
U.K. Secretary of State for the Home Department. CONTEST:  The United Kingdom’s 
Strategy for Countering Terrorism. Norwich: The Stationary Office, 2011. 
 
U.K. Secretary of State for the Home Department. Prevent Strategy. Norwich: The 
Stationary Office, 2011. 65-76. 
 
U.N. General Assembly, 60th session.  The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy. 20 September 2006 (A/RES/60/288).  Official Record. 
 
U.N. General Assembly. “Resolution 60/825 [Uniting Against Terrorism:  
Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy]”. 27 April 2006. 
Official Record (2006). 
 
U.N. Security Council, 7831st meeting. “Resolution 2322 (2016) [Threats to international 
peace and security caused by terrorist acts]” (S/RES/2322).  Official Record.  12 
December 2010.   
 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Countering Terrorist Radicalization Act. 114th 
Cong., 2d sess., 2016. H. Rep. 5471. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/house-bill/5471. 
 
U.S. National Security Agency. UKUSA Agreement (1946). 
 
 
Interviews – IRB #17-02-425 
 
Alexandre Vautravers (Security and Scientific Collaboration Expert at the Global Studies 
Institute, University of Geneva), interview by Lincoln Gimnich, Geneva, 
Switzerland, July 2016. 
 
 67 
Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou (Head of the International History Department 
and Advisory Faculty at the Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding, 
Graduate Institute of International and Developmental Studies, Geneva), 
interview by Lincoln Gimnich, Geneva, Switzerland, July 2016. 
 
Siobhán Martin (Senior Program Director and Deputy Head of the Leadership, Crisis, and 
Conflict Management Programme, Geneva Center for Security Policy), interview 
by Lincoln Gimnich, Geneva, Switzerland, July 2016. 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. "Hard and soft law in international 
governance." International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 421-456. 
 
Allen, Christopher. "Islamophobia in the media since September 11th." Exploring 
Islamophobia: Deepening our understanding of Islam and Muslims. University of 
Westminster 29 (2001). 
 
Bigo, Didier, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, Julien Jeandesboz, 
Valsamis Mitsilegas, Francesco Ragazzi, and Amandine Scherrer. “The EU and 
its Counter-Terrorism Policies after the Paris Attacks.” Liberty and Security in 
Europe, no. 84, (November 2015). 
 
Bernasconi, Claudia. "NATO’s Fight Against Terrorism:  Where Do We Stand?." NATO 
Defense College Research Paper 66 (2011). 
 
Brinson, Mary E., and Michael Stohl. "Media Framing of Terrorism: Implications for 
Public Opinion, Civil Liberties, and Counterterrorism Policies." Journal of 
International & Intercultural Communication 5, no. 4 (November 2012): 270-
290. 
 
Brysk, Alison, and Gershon Shafir, eds. National Insecurity and Human Rights: 
Democracies Debate Counterterrorism. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2007. 
 
Chan, Sewell, and Steven Erlanger. “Questions on U.K. policing mount as 3rd London 
attacker is identified.” The New York Times (New York, NY), June 6, 2017. 
Accessed March 10, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/world/europe/london-attack-uk.html. 
 
Clough, Chris. "Quid pro quo: The challenges of international strategic intelligence 
cooperation." International journal of intelligence and counterintelligence 17, no. 
4 (2004): 601-613. 
 
 68 
Donnelly, Jack. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2013. 
 
Doward, Jamie. " Media coverage of terrorism ‘leads to further violence’." The 
Guardian, August 1, 2016. Accessed March 4, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/aug/01/media-coverage-terrorism-
further-violence. 
 
Downs, George W., and Michael A. Jones. "Reputation, compliance, and international 
law." The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. S1 (2002): S95-S114. 
 
Dozier, Kimberly, P.J. Crowley, Dan Klaidman, and Mark Mazzetti. "Counterterrorism 
and the Media." Lecture, Aspen Security Forum, The Aspen Institute, Aspen, CO, 
July 20, 2013. July 20, 2013. Accessed March 4, 2018. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/20/counterterrorism-and-the-
_n_3625048.html. 
 
Etzioni, Amitai, and Jason H. Marsh, eds. Rights vs. public safety after 9/11: America in 
the age of terrorism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
 
Europol. “Europol's European Counter Terrorism Centre Strengthens the EU's Response 
to Terror.” Press Release, 25 January 2016. 
 
Finaud, Marc. "Information Technology, Terrorism, and Global Security." Policy Briefs 
on the Transcultural Aspects of Security and Stability (2006): 167-178. 
 
Friedman, Uri. “Comparing How Norway and the US Respond to Terror.” The Atlantic, 
July 27, 2011.  Accessed April 3, 2018. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/comparing-how-
norway-and-us-respond-terror/353336/. 
 
Fussey, Pete. "Observing potentiality in the global city: Surveillance and 
counterterrorism in London." International Criminal Justice Review 17, no. 3 
(2007): 171-192. 
 
Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism. 
New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015. 
 
Goodwin, Robin, Krzysztof Kaniasty, Shaojing Sun, and Menachem Ben-Ezra. 
"Psychological distress and prejudice following terror attacks in France." Journal 
of psychiatric research 91 (2017): 111-115. 
 
Greer, Olivia J. "No cause of action: video surveillance in New York City." Michigan 
Telecommunication & Technology Law Review 18 (2011): 589-626. 
 
 69 
Guzman, Andrew T. "Reputation and international law." Georgia Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 34 (2005): 379-391. 
 
Heath-Kelly, Charlotte. "Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the 
‘Radicalisation’ Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy." The British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations 15, no. 3 (August 2013): 394-415. 
 
Hickman, Mary, Lyn Thomas, Sara Silvestri, and Henri Nickels. "" Suspect 
Communities?" Counter-terrorism policy, the press, and the impact on Irish and 
Muslim communities in Britain." (2011). 
 
Hoffman, Bruce. "Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism since 9/11." Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 25, no. 5 (2002): 303-316. 
 
In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide. Issue brief. New 
York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2003. March 25, 2003. Accessed March 4, 
2018. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf. 
 
Jetter, Michael. Terrorism and the Media. Discussion Paper. Universidad EAFIT. 
September 2014. Accessed March 4, 2018. http://ftp.iza.org/dp8497.pdf. 
 
Jore, Sissel Haugdal. "Counterterrorism as Risk Management Strategies." (2012). 
 
Kilcullen, David J. "Countering global insurgency." Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 
(2005): 597-617. 
 
Lefebvre, Stéphane. “The difficulties and dilemmas of international intelligence 
cooperation.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, 
no. 4 (2003): 527-542. 
 
Liptak, Kevin and Jeff Zeleny. “US-UK intel sharing back on after Trump vows to plug 
leaks.” CNN, May 25, 2017. Accessed March 14, 2018. 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/25/politics/nato-trump-intel-sharing/index.html. 
 
Long, Kieran. “So can the secret Ring of Steel save the City from terrorism?.” Evening 
Standard (London, England), Oct. 15, 2010. Accessed March 27, 2018. 
https://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/so-can-the-secret-ring-of-steel-save-the-city-
from-terrorism-6524967.html. 
 
McCahill, Michael, and Clive Norris. "CCTV in London." Report deliverable of 
UrbanEye project (2002). 
 
McVeigh, Karen. "NUS fights back against government's 'chilling' counter-radicalisation 
strategy." The Guardian, September 2, 2015. Accessed March 2, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/sep/02/nus-fights-back-against-
governments-chilling-counter-radicalisation-strategy. 
 70 
 
Mohamedou, Mohammed-Mahmoud Ould. "ISIS and the Deceptive Rebooting of al 
Qaeda." GCSP Policy Paper 5 (2014). 
 
Nacos, Brigitte L. "Terrorism/Counterterrorism and Media in the Age of Global 
Communication." In Second Shimame-Yamaguchi Session. Proceedings of United 
Nations University Global Seminar, University of Shimane, Hamada City, Japan 
(2006). Accessed March 4, 2018. 
http://archive.unu.edu/globseminar/files/shimane06/Nacos_text_en.pdf. 
 
Nacos, Brigitte Lebens., Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Y. Shapiro. Selling Fear: 
Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011. 
 
Niebuhr, Reinhold. The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. New York: C. 
Scribner's Sons, 1945. 
 
“Norway Terror Acts Fast Facts.” CNN online, July 20, 2017.  Accessed April 3, 2018. 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/world/europe/norway-terror-attacks/index.html. 
 
O’Donnell, Aislinn. "Securitisation, Counterterrorism and the Silencing of Dissent: The 
Educational Implications of Prevent." British Journal of Educational Studies 64, 
no. 1 (2015): 53-76. 
 
“Office of Counter-Terrorism.” United Nations. Accessed March 6, 2018. 
https://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/ 
 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Fact Sheet No. 32, 
“Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism.” 2009. 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf 
 
“Parsons Green bombing:  Third arrest over tube attack.” BBC, September 20, 2017.  
Accessed March 10, 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41327872. 
 
Powell, Lauren. “Counter-productive counter-terrorism. How is the dysfunctional 
discourse of Prevent failing to restrain radicalisation?.” Journal for 
Deradicalization 8 (2016):  46-99.   
 
Preventing Education? Human Rights and UK Counter-Terrorism Policy in Schools. 
Rights Watch (UK). July 2016. 
 
Quartermaine, Angela. "Discussing terrorism: a pupil-inspired guide to UK counter-
terrorism policy implementation in religious education classrooms in 
England." British Journal of Religious Education 38, no. 1 (September 05, 2014): 
13-29. 
 
 71 
Rapoport, David C. "The four waves of modern terror: International dimensions and 
consequences." An International History of Terrorism: Western and Non-Western 
Experiences (2013): 282-231. 
 
Reveron, Derek S. "Old Allies, New Friends:  Intelligence-Sharing in the War on 
Terror." Orbis 50, no. 3 (2006): 453-468. 
 
Romocea, Cristian. "Liberal Democracy Between Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques 
Maritain.” 
 
Seib, Philip. "Public diplomacy, new media, and counterterrorism." CPD Perspective on 
Public Diplomacy (2011). 
 
Sepper, Elizabeth. "Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing." Texas 
International Law Journal 46 (2010): 151-207. 
 
Silber, Mitchell D., and Arvin Bhatt. Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat. 
New York: Police Department, 2007. 
 
Snyder, Jack. "One world, rival theories." Foreign Policy 145 (2004): 52-62. 
 
The 9/11 commission report: Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks 
upon the United States. Government Printing Office, 2011. 
 
“The National Counterterrorism Center.”  Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
Accessed March 6, 2018. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-home. 
 
Travis, Alan. "UK counter-terrorism strategy back in focus after London attack." The 
Guardian, March 23, 2017. Accessed March 2, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/23/uk-counter-terrorism-strategy-
back-in-focus-after-london-attack. 
 
U.K. Home Office.  Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent 
Programme, April 2015 to March 2016.  9 November 2017. 
 
U.N. General Assembly, 70th session.  United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy Review.  1 July 2016 (A/RES/70/291).  Official Record. 
 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Homeland Security. The Road 
to Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and Lessons from the Marathon 
Bombings. March 2014. https://homeland.house.gov/files/documents/Boston-
Bombings-Report.pdf. 
 
U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Terrorism 2002-2005. 
Washington, D.C. (2006). 
 
 72 
Versi, Miqdaad. “The latest Prevent figures show why the strategy needs an independent 
review.” The Guardian, November 10, 2017. Accessed March 10, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/10/prevent-strategy-
statistics-independent-review-home-office-muslims. 
 
Walsh, James Igoe. "Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence 
Sharing." Journal of Public Policy 27, no. 2 (2007): 151-181. 
 
Walsh, James Igoe. The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing. New York:  
Columbia University Press, 2010. 
 
Walters, Samuel D. 2013. "Counterterrorism through Humanitarianism: Education as a 
Deterrent to Terrorism." Order No. 3595061, Walden University. 
 
Weimann, Gabriel. New terrorism and new media. Washington, DC: Commons Lab of 
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014. 
 
Williamson, Oliver. "Transaction cost economics." Handbook of new institutional 
economics (2005): 41-65. 
 
Winston, Ali. “Secrecy shrouds NYPD’s anti-terror camera system.” City Limits, April 
26, 2010. Accessed March 27, 2018. https://citylimits.org/2010/04/26/secrecy-
shrouds-nypds-anti-terror-camera-system/. 
 
Whitaker, Beth Elise. "Compliance Among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-
Terrorism Regime." Review of International Studies 36, no. 3 (2010): 639-662. 
